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Abstract
This thesis work focuses on designing a survivable IP-core network with the minimal
investment of spare capacity. A span-oriented spare capacity allocation (SCA) scheme
is proposed to satisfy customers’ availability requirements in the end-to-end (E2E)
sense. The novelty of the proposed SCA scheme is that it meets the E2E availability
requirements despite the lack of knowledge of E2E bandwidth by employing protection
rings covering all links in the network. Different ring selection methods are presented
and also compared from the aspect of network redundancy and LP feasibility which
provide more flexibility to the design. The proposed SCA algorithm further minimizes
total cost of spare capacity by incorporating partial protection within the proposed
architecture. The simulation results show that it can significantly reduce the spare
capacity consumption depending on the availability. The proposed SCA scheme also
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With the advent of numerous network-oriented applications, the world is becoming
more and more dependent on IP-based networks. IP core network is the nerve center
of the network, which provides end-to-end (E2E) quality of service (QoS), service
security and reliance, and performs optimization and adjustment according to the
changes in service. However, there is a critical concern about the devastating impacts
of network failures as the core network carries a large amount of traffic. Despite
best-efforts for physical protections; failures usually occur as the result of human
action (dig-ups, vehicle, human error, terrorism, hacker attacks) or as the result of
natural disasters (flooding, hurricanes) or even by unintentional failures in software
or control systems. Hence, survivability in the face of failures has become an essential
requirement to avoid losing large volumes of traffic data due to a failure of a node
or single/multiple cable cuts. Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS), introduced
by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), has emerged as potential solution for
addressing traffic engineering and providing survivability for IP networks. An impor-
1
tant feature of MPLS is its capability to set up multiple label switched paths between
a source and destination. It integrates Layer 2 information such as bandwidth, la-
tency, and utilization into Layer 3 (IP) aiming to improve IP-packet exchange. Hence,
MPLS provides flexibility in diverting and routing traffic around link failures, con-
gestion, and bottlenecks. On the other hand, with wavelength division multiplexing
(WDM) technology; one single strand of fiber can provide huge bandwidth (in the
range of terabits per second). In order to meet the current huge demands, current
backbone data networks are converging towards a two-layer architecture of IP/MPLS





















































Figure 1.1: Structural layer diagram of the IP-core network.
structural layer diagram of the IP-core network with a possible distribution of pro-
tocols and technologies. The IP level is the cornerstone, the linkage between upper
levels with E2E relationship and lower levels with many different physical transports.
This is not an undisputable structure, many aspects relating MPLS, differential ser-
vice, internal servers, are still in modification. The focus of this work is obviously on
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IP/MPLS framework. With the migration in network architecture, service survivabil-
ity, as one of the indispensable requirements for IP-core network, has received a lot
of attentions in recent years. Survivable network design finds out the backup paths
and pre-plans the spare-capacity to protect given working paths from a set of failure
scenarios. The survivability requirements are usually mentioned in the Service Level
Agreement (SLA) which is a contact between provider and customers that stipulates
certain QoS guarantees. In case of non-fulfillment of SLA contract, service provider
has to pay a penalty to the customers. With the expansion of network capacity
and increasing concentration of services in backbone networks, designing survivable
networks that meets the requirements in SLA becomes increasingly important.
1.1 Objective
The objective of this thesis work is to develop a survivable technique that optimizes
the backup resource allocation while still satisfying the client application availability
requirement. Given a IP-core network, where current working bandwidth of each link
is known and no information on E2E bandwidth requirements are available, we try
to find out appropriate level of spare capacity in order to have a survivable network
that meets the requirements specified in SLA.
1.2 Literature Review
A number of existent survivability techniques, as well as models and algorithms for
general survivable network design are reviewed in this section. Survivability schemes
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are of two types: Restoration and protection scheme. When backup resources (routes
and wavelengths) are pre-computed and reserved in advance, it is called a protection
scheme. On the other hand, when a failure occurs, if another route and a free wave-
length have to be discovered dynamically for each interrupted connection, it is called
a restoration scheme. Apparently, dynamic restoration schemes are more efficient in
utilizing network capacity because they do not allocate spare capacity in advance and
provide resilience against different kinds of failures including multiple failures [2]. On
the contrary, protection schemes have faster recovery time and can guarantee recovery
at the event of service disruption. Restoration scheme also cannot provide provide
recovery guarantee [3].
Depending on shareability, protection schemes can be dedicated or shared. In
dedicated protection (i.e., 1+1 or 1 : 1) there is no sharing between backup resources.
Although dedication protection has faster recovery time; the redundancy (i.e., the
ratio of the total spare capacity over the total working capacity) usually reaches 100%
[4]. With 1 + 1 dedicated protection, for one working system there is completely
another reserved back up system. Both signal paths are launched with a copy of
data transmitted between a source-destination pair during the normal operation. On
the other hand, in 1 : 1 dedicated protection, only the working path is launched
with data traffic while the capacity reserved by the protection path is not in use
allowing other users for protection channel when not needed. In [5], two grooming
algorithms were proposed aiming to provide availability guaranteed connections based
on per-connection requirements. It was suggested to employ less-efficient dedicated
protection for connections with extremely high availability requirements. In shared
protection backup capacity can be shared on some links as long as their protected
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segments are disjoint. In case of share shared protection, the spare capacity taken
by the protection paths is shared by some other protection paths. Although, the
recovery time in shared protection is longer but its resource utilization is better than
dedicated protection [6]. The development of shared protection schemes is generally
complicated as its implementation required one more disjointness.
According to the initialization locations of the rerouting process, the SCA schemes
are subdivided of into two categories: the path-oriented and span-oriented. In path
protection, the end nodes whose traffic is traversing the failed link initiate the rerout-
ing process. Path protection leads to efficient utilization of backup resources and
lower E2E propagation delay for the recovered route, whereas path protection pro-
vides shorter protection switching time. A number of path-protection schemes have
been proposed and extensively investigated in the past, such as shared backup path
protection (SBPP) [8]-[10], [24], [32], shared segment protection (SSP) and [11]-[12].
The design goal of these schemes is to achieve restorability at the minimal invest-
ment of spare capacity subject to different constraints and failure scenarios, such
as a recovery time constraint, survivability guarantee under one or two simultane-
ous failures, or availability constraint etc. SBPP with a single backup path for each
working path is a type of widely adopted protection scenario for achieving dynamic
GMPLS-based recovery due to its generality, simplicity, and dynamicity. Compared
with 1+ 1 dedicated protection, SBPP has been considered as a more advanced SCA
strategy that can significantly reduce the required spare capacity by allowing spare
resource sharing among different backup LSPs. The SBPP method, in [10], is named
as sharing with partial information, where the information available to the routing
algorithm is slightly more than that in the no information scenario. The additional
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information in this scenario is that for each link total bandwidth used by active paths
and total bandwidth used by backup paths is known.
In span protection, the scheme considers the working capacity along each link and
protects the working capacity through a set of detouring paths of the end nodes of
the failed span. In this type of protection, the nodes adjacent to a failed link are
responsible for rerouting the affected traffic flows. Thus it only patches the failed
link in the original path. There are many possible approaches to implement span-
protection scheme [12], [13]-[19]. The work in [13] presented a span protection scheme
to minimize the total cost of spare capacity for required levels of network restoration
through hop-limited protection route following a single link failure. This scheme takes
into account all eligible restoration routes of the network within the hop limit. In
[14], a protection method was proposed to analyze and quantify availability in mesh
restorable networks upon dual-failure scenario. It was claimed that span-restorable
mesh networks could be extremely robust under dual-failure events even though they
were designed against all single span failures. Pre-configure cycle (or p-cycle) is a
fairly recent addition to the set of approaches for span-oriented SCA [15]-[17]. This
method can be thought of an extension Ring-Cover. p-cycles act ring-like way for
on-cycle span failures but also protect against straddling span failures. The straddling
span is not part of the p-cycle but it can bear twice the working bandwidths for each
protection bandwidth on the p-cycle which it straddles. And straddling span itself
bear no protection capacity. Unlike rings, p-cycles are formed solely in the spare-
capacity of a network and do not constrain the routing of working paths to coincide
with the layout of the cycles themselves. Thus p-cycles achieves ring-like speed with
mesh-like capacity efficiency. The spare capacity for the working capacities on differ-
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ent patterns never share each other which makes the p-cycle protection scheme less
efficient than the path-oriented protection scheme. Recently, a simplified framework
for dynamic provisioning of survivable services known as Protected Working Capacity
Envelope (PWCE) method was proposed as an alternative of the SBPP method [18],
[19]. Given a demand matrix, and a routing of demands over the graph, a set of work-
ing capacity requirements on each span can is obtained and a set of corresponding
spare capacity allocations that guarantee restorability for any span failure at a time
is designed. Once, the design is performed for a specific static demand matrix, the
set of working channels on each span can support many different demand patterns,
not only the one exemplar to which it was designed. Any demand matrix, which
is fully routable under the working capacities present, is inherently also survivable
under the particular partitioning of total installed capacity into working and spare.
Moreover, the set of working channels defines a protected operational envelope within
which any number of demand patterns can come and go as long as the resultant in-
stantaneous demand combination lies within the envelope. An important property is
that actions of any type related to ensuring protection occur only on the time-scale
of the statistical evolution of the network load pattern itself, not on the time-scale
of individual connections. Thus, any need for network management actions or state
change dissemination is far less dynamic than the traffic itself. The protected enve-
lope requirement is, however, very slowly changing or static over long periods of time.
In [19], PWCE is implemented in the context of a network based on span-protecting
p-cycles for survivability.
Widely scattered users of the network usually do not care about the network topol-
ogy and implementation; rather they care about E2E availability specified in SLA.
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The analysis of service path availability has recently been performed in some depth
[20]-[24]. The work, in [20], first analyzed availability for different protection schemes
in WDM mesh networks; and then provided a cost-effective appropriate protection
using the availability analysis. However, it only considered static traffic and unpro-
tected or dedicated-path-protected services. The study in [21] proposed a rigorous
methodology to quantify availability under several protection scheme. The study in
[22] addressed the problem of availability analysis in mesh restorable networks under
dual-failure situations, including the cases where the optimization on availability of
each connection subject to a capacity constraint, and the minimization of total spare
capacity subject to an availability constraint. It is found that a span-restorable mesh
network can be extremely robust under dual-failure events against which they are
not specifically designed. In [23], the availability of a WDM network was evaluated,
where an availability-aware link-state packet is devised and disseminated to facilitate
routing under the availability constraint. Few publications have addressed the issue of
provisioning connections with guaranteed availability in SBPP as well. Reference [24]
presented a method for provisioning connections of different classes with guaranteed
availability in the SBPP network. However, this method, which relies on the matrix-
based approach for connection unavailability estimation, offers accurate results only
for networks of national dimensions and is strongly limited in networks of continental
dimensions. In [25], a theory was proposed to estimate a suitable “safety factor” for
SLA availability guarantee depending on the term period. In [26], it was clearly stated
that although there is linkage between network availability and availability specified
in SLA, they are not the same. A method was also suggested to estimate availability
to be guaranteed on SLA contact and to control the associated non-complying risk.
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Recently, extensive research efforts have been addressed on the topic of spare
capacity reconfiguration/reallocation [27]-[30]. The study in [27] proposed a ma-
trix approach in calculating the minimum spare capacity along each link to achieve
100% restorability for any single failure. The proposed Successive Survivable Routing
(SSR) approach can effectively solve the spare capacity reconfiguration by sequen-
tially rerouting the backup path of each connection. However, the availability and
the inference by double simultaneous failures have not been considered. The work,
in [28], investigated how to improve the dual-failure restorability with p-cycle which
was originally designed for achieving 100% restorability for any single failure under
both static and dynamic situations. Since the amount of resource consumption of
p-cycle is similar to or even more that by link protection, the performance can be
improved by using SBPP or SSP. In [29], inter-arrival spare capacity reconfiguration
is performed by investigating into the computation efficiency and grouping policies
of network traffic, where each lightpath is prepared with backup path segments for
achieving 100% restorability in the single failure scenario. In [30], a new link-state
metric in rerouting each backup path through a wavelength channel was proposed.
The proposed approach reallocates spare capacity without disrupting working services
and can operate in the context of shared-path protection (with backup multiplexing).
Unlike previous spare capacity reallocation approaches which aim at minimizing to-
tal spare capacity, the proposed load-balancing approach minimizes the network load
vector in order to achieve uniform load distribution.
Most of the previously reported studies focused on improving E2E availability
with a restoration granularity in terms of the number of simultaneous failures that
can be handled for achieving 100% restorability, in which the source nodes switch
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100% of the working bandwidth over to the backup LSPs. The assumptions on uni-
form and indivisible bandwidth of each connection have been seen to address much
unnecessary limitation on the applicability of the developed models in different net-
work environments, where the possibilities of further reducing the spare capacity by
partially restoring the working LSPs have been excluded. In fact, in IP-core net-
work, a LSP could be composed of numerous independent service sessions under the
framework of GMPLS-based recovery. This structure provides the feasibility of hav-
ing partial restoration for a LSP based on divisibility of the LSP in the restoration
phase. In this case, the source node has the capability of randomly dropping some
service sessions of the LSP while restoration is performed. In other words, the source
node partially restores a working LSP by switching over a specific proportion of the
working bandwidth to the backup LSP while the rest of the bandwidth is dropped. It
is necessary to have an approach that can precisely evaluate the E2E availability for
the SBPP connections considering a more general network environment and design
scope. The work, in [31], introduced a novel dynamic availability-aware survivable
routing architecture, which employs partial protection for a working path. The pro-
posed scheme achieved much finer design granularity and significantly reduced the
required redundancy in the effort of achieving a specific availability constraint for
each connection request. In [32], a policy-based model was proposed to evaluate
the E2E availability and to reconfigure the spare capacity allocation (SCA) for dy-
namic provisioning of SBPP connections. Partial protection was employed in both
failure-dependent (FD) and failure-independent (FID) policy-based architecture. Sev-
eral research efforts have been dedicated to the study of differentiated survivability
mechanisms to employ partial protection [33]-[36]. In [33], a modified shared path
10
protection switching scheme with differentiated reliability (DiR) in WDM mesh net-
works was proposed. In the scheme, client demands and circuits are differentiated
based on their requested individual degree of reliability in a cost-effective way. The
cost reduction is inversely proportional to the reliability degree required by the client
circuit. In [34], the DiR concept is applied to support QoS where partial protection is
adopted. As only a fraction of bandwidth protected in the backup path, this scheme
outperforms 1 : 1 protection with respect to blocking probability and resources re-
served for backups. The study in [35], presented various methods for providing service
differentiation in survivable WDM networks and discusses their performance. Such
methods are broadly classified under various paradigms such as DiR, quality of pro-
tection (QoP), and quality of recovery. However, most of these works were proposed
for WDM networks and do not consider service availability.
1.3 Contributions
The design of survivable networks that can reduce redundancy and achieve a spe-
cific availability constraint is a long-lasting challenge. Very few publications have
addressed the issue of provisioning connections with guaranteed availability. Any
span-protection scheme which can guarantee availability requirements in the E2E
sense is yet to be found. The main contribution of this thesis is the development
availability-aware SCA algorithm in a network scenario where bandwidth require-
ment of any connection is unknown.
In the proposed SCA scheme, the network is covered with sufficient rings such
that each link is essentially a part of at least one ring. When any link fails it has a
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protection path through the other part of the ring. This obviously a span-oriented
ring-covered protection. The selection of rings for each link is done based on many
different strategies which gives more flexibility to the design. The proposed multi-
constraint optimization problem or the SCA problem is formulated using Linear Pro-
gramming (LP). Thus the proposed SCA scheme provisions connections that achieve
the E2E availability higher than while as close as possible to that defined in the SLA
at the minimal investment of backup resources. Two other prominent methods of
SCA are also implemented for comparison purpose.
Partial protection is also incorporated in the proposed SCA scheme for better
utilization of resource allocation which is also unique in case of span protection com-
pared to other span protection schemes available these days. Different ring selection
methods are also compared from the aspect of network redundancy and LP feasibility
required for measuring spare capacity.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the causes
of network failures and denotes the impact of outage. This chapter also depicts few
basic concepts and techniques on network survivability management that are useful
in the following thesis paper. At the end, it formulates the problem. Chapter 3
describes the proposed availability-aware SCA scheme employing partially protected
rings in details. Chapter 4 first presents the test networks and experimental conditions
and then analyzes the simulation results along with figures and remarks. Chapter 5
concludes the work and suggests future work.
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Chapter 2
Causes of Failure, Survivability
Measures and Problem Statement
This chapter ascertains the causes of network failures and denotes the impact of out-
age. This chapter also formulates the problem and discusses a number of possible
schemes to solve the problem.
2.1 Causes of Network Failure and Impacts of
Outage
Current backbone data networks are converging towards a two-layer architecture of
IP/MPLS over an optical transport layer as shown in Fig. 1.1. No matter how ad-
vanced today’s widespread IP-core network, despite best-efforts with physical protec-
tions it could be damaged as it is in a cable. Internet search engine returns hundreds
of cable cut related network outage notifications. For example, on 100, 000 installed
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route miles of networks it implies more than one disruption per day on average [18].
The authors, in [38], highlight that according to Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) 2002 report, metro networks annually experience 13 cuts for every 1000
miles of fiber and, long haul networks experience 3 cuts for 1000 miles of fibers. The
annual number of cable cuts has also risen with the increased growth of the Internet.
It is to be noted that these frequencies of cable cut events are hundreds of times
higher than corresponding reports of transport layer node failures. This is why net-
work survivability designed is primarily focused on recovery from span or link failures
from cable cuts.
There are several ways in which cables can be cut, and the causes of cable damage
can be classified as human error, accidental, or malicious. Cable dig-ups is by far the
most common cause of cable damage and failure. In fact, a comprehensive survey
on the frequency and causes of cable cut finds that almost 60% of all cuts were
caused by cable dig-ups. The vast majority of those were due to digging errors or
inadequate notification to cable location authorities prior to digging. Accidents are
one of the major causes of cable cuts. Vehicles running into aerial poles, fires, fallen
trees and floods can disrupt the networks. Animals have also been implicated in cable
cuts. For example, the rat can chew cable, which is very common in Ontario. Deer,
gophers, squirrels, and even sharks are believed to be responsible for a number of
cable outages. Vandalism and sabotage are also responsible for cable cuts. Terrorist
attacks on fiber cable may be a great concern in the near future to the information
security community.
Cable cuts impact the network users in a variety of ways. Revenue losses to
business and negative publicity from outages are inevitable consequences at the event
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of network failures. An outage, that lasts for half an hour or more and affects 30, 000
or more subscribers are obliged for reporting to the FCC. According to FCC report,
each cable cut affected over 105, 000 customers for over 4 hours on average. One
survey estimates US enterprizes lost more than $500/year in potential revenue due
to network failures that affect critical business functions. Web-based e-commerce
services suffer from bankruptcies from an hour or more of outage. Mission critical
Internet service providers quote $100, 000/minute or more revenue loss from failure
of network. Depending on which services are affected, cable cuts can have disastrous
consequences. Most of the cases, service providers have to pay rebates to customers
based on the numbers or outage duration. Even though statistics on smaller outages
are not tracked, it is evident that cable cuts have huge financial impact on businesses
that depend on the communication network.
2.2 Survivability Measures
Survivability is the ability of a network to maintain or restore an acceptable level of
performance during network failures by applying various restoration techniques. The
term is an inherent attribute of the network design regardless of if, or how often,
failures actually occur. It gauges the ability of a network of being able to keep on
functioning in the presence of various failure scenarios. Some quantitative measures
of survivability are: restorability, restoration time, reliability, and availability.
Restorability is design-oriented parameter reflecting the capability of a network to
survive a specific failure scenario. In this class of measurements, each relevant failure
scenario is first postulated to have occurred, then an assessment of survivability is
15
made.
Restoration time defines the exact disruption holding time, which should be min-
imized as much as possible.
In general, reliability is a qualitative perception of the network being predictable
and usually available. Technically, it is the probability that a system will provide its
intended service uninterrupted for a period of time. Let λ is failure rate per member
of the group given that the member has already survived until time t. Then the





Reliability is thus always a non-increasing function of time with R(t = 0) = 1 and
R(t =∞) = 0. This survivability metric takes into account the probability of failure
onset as well as the survivability response or capability of the network. Here assump-
tion that failures can be characterized by random variables with given probability
distribution functions. With the increasing growth of mission-critical Internet appli-
cations customers are requiring highly-reliable network services. Depending on the
service, a number of different ways in which the reliability of a network or service
can be measured. Some relevant measures of reliability are availability, throughput,
delay, probability of graph disconnection, dial-tone delay, service establishment times,
cell-loss rate, error-rate, and so on [22]. To the users of IP-core network, the E2E
availability is of supreme concern. The concept of availability is focused next.
Reliability is only concerned with how likely a system stay in operation for a
certain time without a service-affecting failure occurring. Hence, another survivability
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metric is needed to asses continuously operating systems which are subject to repair
when failures occur. The probability of finding a system available can be high even
if failures are frequent and promptly repaired. Availability is the probability that a
system undergoing repair after each failure is found in the “operating” state at any








where Tobs is a total observation time. Availability depends on the Mean Time to
Failure (MTTF), which is the expected time between failures, and the Mean Time to
Repair (MTTR) which is the expected time to next failure. Fig. 2.1 shows the failure
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In availability analysis, it is usually easier to work with unavailability quantities
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because of some simplifications that can be done on the unavailability of elements
in series and in parallel. The unavailability U is the probabilistic complement of
availability A and defined as:









= λ ·MTTR (2.5)
Thus unavailability approximately represents simply the repair time times the fre-
quency of failure, or the failure rate in the approximate inverse-time units.
The internationally used unit for measuring or specifying failure rates is failures
in time (FIT). Conventionally a period of 109 hours is used as a time scale to quantify
the failure rates:
a failure rate of 1 failure in 109 hours = 1 “FIT” (2.6)
Hence, MTTF in hours can be expressed as:
MTTF = 109/FITs (2.7)
1 failure/year is equal to 114, 155 FITs and conversely 1 FIT is equal to 1 failure
in 114, 155 years. Also, it is rather common to express unavailability as the average
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outage time referred to this reference period:
U = (MTTR * FITs)/109 (2.8)
For instance, “Three nines availability” is equivalent 8.76 hours of outage per year
and “Five nines availability” is equivalent 5.26 minutes of outage per year.
2.3 Two Basic Concepts
In this section two basic concepts that are necessary for complete understanding of
the work presented are described.
2.3.1 Partial Restorability
In case of partial restoration, the amount of bandwidth required for the backup path
is only a fraction of the working path’s bandwidth. Let the working and protection
pathes be denoted as W and P , respectively. The physical availability of W and P
are Aw and Ap, respectively. The protection level is θ. Since P is θ−restorative to
W , only θ of the working bandwidth is protected by P while the rest 1− θ of working
bandwidth is not protected. The availability in the former θ of working bandwidth is
Aθ = 1− (1− Aw)(1− Ap)
The availability is in the latter 1− θ bandwidth
A1−θ = Aw
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Therefore, the overall E2E availability is
Awp = Aθ · θ + A1−θ · (1− θ)
= [1− (1− Aw)(1− Ap)] · θ + Aw · (1− θ)
= 1− (1− Aw)(1− θ · Ap) (2.9)
This scheme thus outperforms 1 : 1 protection in terms of blocking probability and
resources reserved for backups.
2.3.2 E2E Availability
Let Aw and Ap denote the E2E physical availability of W and P , respectively. As

























As the physical unavailability is very small (ui << 1), the higher order terms of
ui are ignored. Ap can also be reformulated using Similar approach. The physical
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unavailability of W and P can now be expressed as:








































Figure 2.2: E2E availability of two parallel paths.
in Fig. 2.2, the E2E availability of the working path [b-c-f], Aw = 1 −
∑
(u3 + u6)
and that of the protection path [b-e-g-f], Ap = 1 −
∑
(u4 + u8 + u9). As availability
multiplies for parallel path, the E2E availability between node b and f, A = Aw×Ap.
2.4 Problem Statement
In general, the network topology is composed of links and nodes in constant peril
of being interrupted. Let this original network topology be represented by a graph
G(V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of links. The working capacity
of each link j is known; while the bandwidth requirement of each connection c is
unknown. Availability requirements of all connections specified in SLA and physical
availability of all links are given. A protection scheme has to be designed which
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ensures E2E availability specified in SLA for all connection c. Let Sj and Cj are the
amount of spare capacity and the cost of unit spare capacity corresponding to link j.
The design objective is to minimize the allocation of spare capacity on the network
while guaranteed the availability required. Total allocated spare capacity is the sum








To make the protection scheme more cost-efficient; partial protection could be adopted
instead of 100% restoration while still satisfying the client application availability
requirement.
One possible method to solve the above stated problem is to employ span protec-
tion scheme that uses hop-limited multiple protection routes [13]. The spare capacity







Subject to the constraints:
∑
p∈Pi




δji,p · fi,p ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ E, and i 6= j
fi,p ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ E, p ∈ Pi
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In the above formulation, Pi is the set of eligible protection routes for link i within
the hop limit; qi is the protection level required for link i, fi,p is the “restoration flow”
through the p-th restoration route of link i; δji,p is a binary indicator which takes the
value of 1 if the protection route p of link i traverses link j and “0” otherwise. This
scheme can solve for SCA when E2E bandwidth requirements are unknown. qi in the
above formulation also allows the scheme to employ partial protection. However, this
scheme cannot guarantee E2E availability requirements specified in SLA.
p-Cycle is another possible candidate to solve the above formulation [15]-[17]. The
































1 if link j is on-cycle or straddling with pattern i
0 if either one or both nodes of link j not on pattern i
In the above formulation, wj is working capacity on link j; rj is the spare capacity
excess of those required of link j; Np is the set of candidate patterns (i.e., uni-
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directional elementary cycles); ni is the number of copies of pattern i. There is no
provision for employing partial protection in this scheme. This scheme also fails to
guarantee E2E availability requirement.
Policy-based (FD/FID) SBPP method that employs partial protection could be





Subject to (with FID policy):













(1− θc) · πr ∀c ∈ C
Ac ≥ Ac,SLA ∀c ∈ C
0 ≥ θc ≥ 1 ∀c ∈ C
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Subject to (with FD policy):















(1− θc,r) · πr ∀c ∈ C
Ac ≥ Ac,SLA ∀c ∈ C




In the above formulation, Qj,r denotes the total amount of spare capacity required
to be allocated on link j with failure pattern r; C is the set of connections; Wc and
Pc are the set of links along working path and protection path of connection c; bc is
the bandwidth requirement of connection c; θc,r is the protection level of connection
c with failure pattern r; Ac and Ac,SLA are the availability requirements without and
with SLA, respectively and πr is the stationary probability of failure pattern r. In all
cases, Rcwp is the set of failure patterns which interrupted both working and protection
path of connection c; Rc
w1p
is the set of failure patterns whose first failure disrupts
working path of connection c and second failure doesn’t affect protection path of c;
Rc
w2p
is the set of failure patterns whose first failure doesn’t affect the protection path
of connection c and second failure disrupts the working path of c.
This method can guarantee E2E bandwidth requirements and save significant
spare capacity employing partial protection. However, this method cannot solve the
problem as the the information of bc, Wc and Pc for all connections are unknown. This





In this chapter the proposed availability-aware spare capacity allocation scheme is pre-
sented. Methods of employing different ring selection strategies are briefly described.
An example showing how the proposed protection scheme works is addressed at the
end.
3.1 System Model
The system model is shown in Fig. 3.1. The main focus is on the GMPLS-enabled IP-
core survivable networks. The GMPLS control plane relies on a peer model in which
all network elements (MPLS routers and optical cross connects) share the same control
and signaling plane. The central server is equipped with traffic engineering tool (TET)
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Figure 3.1: The system model and functionalities.
evaluation tool (MPET). The TET and the MPET will interact with the GMPLS
plane. The MPET will provide a measure of the various parameters of the network
and routers like the link current bandwidth, overall delay, jitter, queue lengths, in
the routers, etc. This information will be input to the TET. Based on this measured
state of the network, along with information on physical availability and availability
specified on SLA the TET will interact with the ST. The ST will simulate a network
with the current state of the managed network and apply the decision of the TET
to verify the achieved performance. The TET management tasks include resource
management (LSP setup/dimensioning, LSP preemption, LSP capacity allocation)
and route management (LSP routing), as shown in Fig. 3.1.
The network is denoted as G(V,E) with V set of nodes and E set of edges as
stated earlier. To make the analysis straightforward, each node in the original net-
work is replaced by two vertices with an additional link connecting the twin vertices
with the node splitting technique [39]. Such a graph yields the desired character-
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istic where each vertex has a perfect availability, while only links may fail. Failure
on a node in the original network is now simply translated into a failure event on
the corresponding links in the transferred graph and the rest of the thesis will only
consider the availability of each link in the transferred graph. It is assumed that
only the IP/MPLS layer provides protection for each working LSP for availability
enhancement. IP routers are usually located at the city and high redundancy and
extremely short recovery time can be achieved. Therefore, only failures on each IP
link are considered whereas each IP router is taken as perfect. To simply the analysis,
the E2E unavailability is calculated by adding link unavailabilities. Let the network







and follows a single physical route connecting from the
source vertex sc and the terminating vertex dc along with the required bandwidth
bc and availability constraint A
SLA
c . Notice that although working bandwidth vj on
each link j is known; bc is unknown for all connection c.
3.2 The Availability Aware SCA Scheme
As IP-core network has moved towards mission-critical infrastructure, availability
of some connection-oriented multimedia applications such as VoIP, real-time video
streaming becomes increasingly important. Network availability is evaluated as the
average availability of connections in the network. Although there is a close link be-
tween the network connection availability and the availability specified in SLA, they
are not the same [37]. In fact, over a fixed observation time, actual connections’
availability is varied around the average availability, i.e. some connections behave
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better and others behave worse in terms of availability requirements. As a conse-
quence, setting the availability in SLA at the value of the average availability, the
network operator has to comply with the associate risks of paying refunds to those
customers whose connections behave worse than average. Very few publications have
addressed the issue of provisioning connections with guaranteed availability. Any
span-protection scheme which can guarantee availability requirements in the E2E
sense is yet to be found.
In this thesis work, a new algorithm for availability-aware spare-capacity assign-
ment in survivable networks is presented, which attempts to optimize network re-
source utilization. The novelty of the proposed scheme is that it meets the E2E
availability requirements despite the lack of knowledge of E2E bandwidth by employ-
ing protection rings covering all links in the network. The proposed SCA algorithm
further minimizes total cost of spare capacity by incorporating partial protection
within the proposed architecture. Only a percentage of the working bandwidth is
restored by protection path once the working path is interrupted. The proposed pro-
tection scheme consists of two steps. The first step is network specific and executed
only once, during the network planning phase. The second step is connection specific
and executed online, whenever the unavailability of connection has to be assessed.
The flowchart in Fig. 3.2 shows the steps involved in the availability-aware SCA
scheme employing partially protected rings. The following two subsections describe
the different strategies for protection ring selection and the proposed LP formulation
for SCA.
The derivations of the proposed protection scheme are based on the following
assumptions:
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Figure 3.2: Flowchart of the steps involved in the availability-aware SCA scheme
employing partially protected rings.
• All IP-core links have two-state “working” or “failed”;
• All IP-core links fail independently;
• The repair time and the time to fail of a fiber link are memoryless, exponentially
distributed random processes with constant means MTTR and MTTF;
• At most two fiber links can simultaneously fail in the network;
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• A working path and its corresponding protection path are always link-disjointly
routed.
3.2.1 Protection Ring Selection Methods
The network is covered with sufficient rings such that each link is essentially a part of
at least one ring. When any link fails it has a protection path through the other part
of the ring. This is obviously a span-oriented ring-covered protection. The protection
paths do not carry any demand until a failure occurs. Hence, they can be rearranged
and rerouted as the working bandwidth of links or the network conditions change.
There are many possible rings for each link. The selection of rings for each link can
be done based on many different strategies which gives more flexibility to the design.
The ring selection methods can be named as:
i) Highest availability rings.
ii) Minimal number rings.
iii) Shortest path rings.
iv) LP based load balancing rings.
v) Most efficient network management rings.
The first three approaches are part of the proposed availability-aware protection
scheme. Here is the brief discussion on first three strategies of protection ring se-
lection.
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[i] Highest Availability Rings (HARs): In this case, for each link a ring
is selected such that it has the highest availability in its protection routes. For each
link, all possible routes between the the end nodes are found first. Among them the
route with highest availability is selected as protection ring for that link. Since for
larger network, the number of all possible routes between the end nodes of that link
can be very large; the search is limited by the number of hop-count. Finding all
possible routes between end nodes of a link is little bit tricky; here is the Pseudo code
for HARs selection method.
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Pseudo Code for HAR Selection Method:
Notations:
G(V,E) : a network G, with set of V nodes and E edges
i, j, k : loop index
n1, n2 : end nodes of an edges
PossPathsi : a set of nodes of all possible paths between the end nodes of edge i
HopLimit : a constant to avoid flooding of possible paths in a large network
Inputs: G(V,E)
Outputs: HARs
for(i = 0; i < E; i++)
add n1 to PossPathsi
for(j = 0; j < HopLimit; j ++)
for all paths listed in PossPathsi
find neighboring nodes of the last added node in PossPathsi
add that node, if it is not already in that path
end for
end for
for all paths listed in PossPathsi // checking for path validity
if the end node is other than n2; remove paths from PossPathsi
end for
find the path with highest availability from PossPathsi
form ring for link i between link i and the highest availability path
end for
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Although this method could result in highest execution time, this method is ex-
pected to have feasible result even at lower USLA. The number of rings is obviously
equal to the number of links in the network.
[ii] Minimal Number Rings (MNRs): In this ring selection strategy, rings
are formed in such way that the number of rings covering all links is minimized. The
motivation for employing MNRs comes from the expectation that minimal number

































































































Figure 3.3: The operation of minimal number ring selection method.
MNRs are:
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• Step 1: A link is chosen arbitrary and then deleted temporally. The shortest
distance between the end nodes of the chosen ring is found out over the network;
• Step 2: A ring is formed for that link. Links part of this ring are considered to
have the same protection ring;
• Step 3: Another link which is not already a part of any rings is chosen and a
ring is formed in a similar way for that link;
• Step 4: The steps are repeated until all links are covered with at least one ring.
Fig. 3.3 illustrates the step-by-step procedure for creating MNRs on a small network
with 7 nodes and 9 links. The number of rings in other two methods is equal to the
number of links in the network, whereas in this method the number of rings is reduced
considerably. For example, there are only 3 rings cover all 9 links. If any link has
more than one ring; ring with shortest hop count is considered its protection ring.
Here link 2 has two rings (ring 1 with links 0, 2, 5, 6, 1 and ring 2 with links 2, 3, 4);
ring 2 is selected for link 2 as its protection ring.
[iii] Shortest Path Rings (SPRs): For both HAR and MNR methods, some
links may have long protection rings. SPRs are formed such that all links have rings
with shortest path in terms of hop count. In this case, for each link, the route with
shortest distance between the end nodes of link is found over the network excluding
that link. A protection ring is then formed with that link and the shortest path
for that link. The proposed protection scheme, employing SPR, usually has fast
restoration time as less network elements are involved and fewer messages are sent
and acknowledged during the restoration procedures. This method also finds out
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Table 3.1: Notation
C The set of all connections.
sc Source node of connection c.
dc Destination node of connection c.
bc Bandwidth requirement of connection c.
wc The working path of connection c.
Wc The set of links along wc.
ASLAc Availability requirement of connection c specified in the SLA.
USLAc Corresponding unavailability to A
SLA
c
aj Availability of link j.
ar\j Availability of the protection path of link j.
vj The working capacity of link j.
θj The restoration level required for link j.
Sj Amount of spare capacity on link j.
Cj Cost of a spare channel corresponding to link j.
δ
j
i Binary indicator, of value equals to 1 if the protection route
of link i uses the link j and 0 otherwise.
protection ring with minimum execution time. The number of rings is equal to the
number of links in the network.
3.2.2 The LP Formulation for Availability-Aware Spare
Capacity Allocation
Consider the notation in Table 3.1. In this section, a LP is formulated to determine
Sj for j ∈ E such that E2E availability is high enough to fulfill the SLA with the





. The E2E bandwidth requirements are unknown; however the working
capacity of each link is the summation of bandwidth requirements for all connections
36





The unavailability of link j is 1 − aj. Since the protection level for link j is θj
and its protection path’s availability is ar\j, the unavailability of the protection path
of link j is 1 − θjar\j. Unavailability multiplies for parallel connection; thus the
unavailability of link j with ring cover protection is:
urj = (1− aj)(1− θjar\j)
The unavailability for each connection with ring protection should be less than the
unavailability specified in SLA for that connection. Thus, for all c in C, the following












where, urc and u
r
j are the unavailability of connection c and link j, respectively, with















(1− aj)(1− θjar\j), ∀c ∈ C (3.3)
0 ≤ θj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ E (3.4)
Constraints in (3.2) ensure that link j provides enough spare capacity if protection
route of link i uses that link. Constraints in (3.3), ensures that the E2E availability
requirement of each connection specified in the SLA is met. Constraints in (3.4) re-
stricts that the predefined restoration attempt can store only a part of the interrupted
bandwidth. For link j, θj of the working bandwidth is protected by the protection
path of that link while the rest 1 − θj of working bandwidth is not protected. The
variables are to be solved are θj and Sj for all j ∈ E. The number of variables grows




and the number of constraints grows on the order of
O(|E| × |E − 1| + |C|). Fig. 3.4 illustrates how the working bandwidth of a link





































(a) A 7-node network with 4 rings 
(d) Both paths restored through corrsponding ring  




































Figure 3.4: Illustration of how a link can be resorted at the event of a failure while
still satisfying the E2E availability requirements.
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Chapter 4
Simulation Results and Discussions
Simulation results are presented comparing the performance of different ring selection
strategies used in the proposed scheme. The chapter concludes with some remarks.
4.1 Network Topology and Simulation Parameters
The simulation program is developed using C++ and executed on a LINUX server
with dual-core 2.8 GHz CPU and 1 GB memory. The LP formulation is solved
using CPLEX 10.0 optimization packages [40]. Five network topologies are used as
representative of typical IP-core network to asses the proposed scheme. The networks
have average nodal degrees d̄ ranged from 2.86 to 8.45 as given in Table 4.1. Network
topologies are also shown in Fig. 4.1 excluding Bell Canada network which is too
large to be shown. Without loss of generality, the following assumptions are made: (a)
traffic demands between any node pairs are unknown; (b) the network has symmetrical
working bandwidths on any links without loss of generality; (c) each node can serve
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Table 4.1: Network information
Network TestNet1 TestNet2 GerNet EuroNet BellNet
V 7 11 17 37 88
E 10 23 26 58 372
d̄ 2.86 4.18 3.06 3.13 8.45













































































(a) 7 node test network (TesNet1)
(c) 17 node German network (GerNet)
(b) 11 node test network (TestNet2)
(d) 37 node European network (EuroNet)
Figure 4.1: Network topologies
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Table 4.2: Performance comparison between different ring selection strategies in terms
of redundancy for all networks.
USLA 10
−3 10−4 5× 10−4 10−5
Ring
Selection M1∗ M2? M3§ M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Strategy
TestNet1 41 21 21 79 71 71 82 74 74 84 Inf † Inf
TestNet2 55 38 26 86 82 78 87 85 82 90 Inf Inf
GerNet 27 22 17 39 31 25 59 51 47 95 Inf Inf
EuroNet 17 14 11 22 19 15 38 32 25 87 Inf Inf
BellNet 9 5 4 24 11 10 31 13 12 Inf Inf Inf
∗HARs; ?MNRs; §SPRs; †Infeasible
as a ingress or egress node of the network; and (d) link failure is proportional to
link length, and the average failure rate is 1/MTTF per km. normalized in the unit
of FIT. Outage time limit or the unavailability specified in the SLA is taken same
for all possible connection pairs to simplify the simulation. To compare the proposed
scheme which employs different ring selection methods, the performance metrics taken
are network redundancy, number of connections for which LP become infeasible and
execution time.
4.2 Network Redundancy
The network redundancy is measured by the ratio of the total spare capacity over
the total working capacity. The redundancy in percent required by the proposed
SCA scheme employing different ring selection strategies for all network topologies
are listed in Table 4.2 as found from the simulation. Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 show the
redundancy required by the proposed SCA scheme employing different ring selection





























Partial protection with HARs
Partial protection with MNRs
Partial Protection with SPRs
Figure 4.2: Performance comparison between different ring selection strategies in
terms of redundancy for Bell Canada network.
tions in redundancy for other networks are also found similar to these two networks.
For all ring selection strategies, redundancy increases as the USLA or the outage time
limit specified in SLA is reduced. Nonetheless, network resources can be saved de-
pending on the unavailability stated in the SLA. As for example, in case of BellNet
when employs HARs as its protection route, the required redundancies are 9% and
24% at USLA = 10
−3 and USLA = 10
−4, respectively. Whereas, in case of TestNet2
employing HARs as its protection route, the required redundancies are 55% and 86%
at USLA = 10
−3 and USLA = 10
−4, respectively. When the proposed SCA scheme em-
ploys other ring selection strategies (MNRs and SPRs), the variation in redundancy
for other networks are also found similar to that of HARs selection strategy.































Partial protection with HARs
Partial protection with MNRs
Partial Protection with SPRs
Figure 4.3: Performance comparison between different ring selection strategies in
terms of redundancy for 11-node test network.
specified in SLA is reduced. Inversely, network resources can be saved if lower avail-
ability is offered in the SLA. Note also that when the availability requirement is above
0.9999 (unavailability specified in SLA is lower than 10−4), the redundancy increases
sharply. This is because high availability requirement can only be met with protec-
tion level close to 100%. Also large and dense network (BellNet) tends to require less
redundancy than the small and sparse network (TestNet2) at specific USLA.
Different ring selection strategies are now compared in terms of redundancy. As
can be seen, for the network BellNet, the require redundancy by the protection scheme
when employing HARs, MNRs and SPRs, are 24%, 11%, and 10%, respectively at
specific USLA = 10
−4. Also for the network TestNet1, the require redundancy by the
protection scheme when employing HARs, MNRs and SPRs, are 79%, 71%, and 71%,
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Table 4.3: Performance comparison between different ring selection strategies in terms
of LP feasibility for all networks.
USLA 5× 10
−4 10−5 5× 10−5 10−6
Ring
Selection M1∗ M2? M3§ M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Strategy
TestNet1 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 19 19 40 71 71
TestNet2 0 0 0 0 8 8 0 38 37 55 79 79
GerNet 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 17 18 25 71 72
EuroNet 0 0 0 0 6 7 0 22 23 23 84 85
BellNet 0 0 0 0.1 1 0.9 3 7 7 33 42 42
∗HARs; ?MNRs; §SPRs
respectively at specific USLA = 10
−4. As expected, the SCA scheme when employs
HARs requires more redundancy than the other two ring selection strategies as the
former method resulted in longer routes in some of its protection rings in order to
get highest availability. There is not that much visible gap between the protection
schemes that employ MNRs and SPRs in their protection paths. It is also to be noted
that although the proposed SCA when employs HARs accrues highest redundancy
when compared to other ring selection strategy at lower USLA, this method can give
feasible results where other methods fail in doing so. For example, at USLA = 10
−5,
the scheme employing HARs still results in feasibility where other two methods gives
infeasible results for all network topologies except BellNet.
4.3 LP Feasibility
The second objective measure is the number of connections for which LP becomes
infeasible. Numerical results are summarized in Table 4.3. For BellNet and Test-



















































Partial protection with HARs
Partial protection with MNRs
Partial Protection with SPRs
Figure 4.4: Performance comparison between different ring selection strategies in
terms of LP feasibility for Bell Canada network.
USLA are plotted in Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5, respectively. Similar trends are found
for other networks too. In case of BellNet when employs MNRs as its protection
route, the numbers of connections for which LP becomes infeasible are 1% and 7%
at USLA = 10
−5 and USLA = 5 × 10
−5, respectively. Whereas, in case of TestNet2
employing MNRs as its protection route, the number of connections for which LP
become infeasible are 8% and 38% at USLA = 10
−5 and USLA = 5×10
−5, respectively.
It is clear that the number of connections for which LP becomes infeasible increases
as the availability requirement tightens or USLA is reduced.
Different ring selection strategies are now compared in terms of LP feasibility.
In case of the network EuroNet, when the SCA scheme employs HARs, MNRs and

















































Partial protection with HARs
Partial protection with MNRs
Partial Protection with SPRs
Figure 4.5: Performance comparison between different ring selection strategies in
terms of LP feasibility for 11-node test network.
7%, respectively at specific USLA = 10
−5. Also for the network TestNet2, when the
SCA scheme employs HARs, MNRs and SPRs, the numbers of connections for which
LP becomes infeasible are 0%, 8%, and 8%, respectively at specific USLA = 10
−5.
As expected, the SCA scheme employing HARs performs better than others. The
number of connections for which LP becomes infeasible is lower for HARs than that
of other two methods (MNRs and SPRs). When the availability requirement is high,
the scheme employing HARs still results in feasibility where other two methods gives
infeasible results. This gives valid reason to employ rather complex HAR selection
method in order to obtain feasible results.
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Table 4.4: Execution time of different ring formation schemes.
Test Network TestNet1 TestNet2 GerNet EuroNet BellNet
HARs ≤ 1 ms 2 s 3 s 5 s 23 s
MNRs ≤ 1 ms ≤ 1 ms ≤ 1 s 2 s 4 s
SPRs ≤ 1 ms ≤ 1 ms ≤ 1 s ≤ 1 s ≤ 1 s
4.4 Execution Time
The third objective measure is program execution time. Numerical results are sum-
marized in Table 4.4. Once the rings are selected, the program execution time to
solve the LP formulation is same for all different ring selection methods. However,
execution time to select rings is different for different ring selection algorithms. The
number of rings formed in MNRs is less than the number of links in the network; as
links share the rings among them. While the number of rings to be formed is equal to
the number of rings for other two methods (HARs and SPRs). Thus MNR selection
method is the most efficient as it requires the least time. On the other hand, HARs
method is the least efficient in terms time consuming as this method requires to find
all possible routes in search of protection route of highest availability.
4.5 Comparisons with other methods
In this section, simulation results are compared with other conventional schemes.
The other methods implemented for comparison purpose are Herzberg and Bye’s hop-
limited span protection (HerzByeHopLim) [13] and (FD/FID) policy based availability-
aware SBPP methods (SBPP-FD and SBPP-FID ) [32]. As SBPP-FD/FID meth-
ods require E2E bandwidth; for comparison purpose, it is assumed that this infor-
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Table 4.5: Performance comparison with other existence methods in terms of redun-
dancy for all networks
Protection Level θ = 0.4 θ = 0.8
Method M1∗ M2? M3§ M4\ M5† M6‡ M1∗ M2? M3§ M4\ M5† M6‡
TestNet1 25.3 18.1 18.0 51.3 54.0 47.2 65.0 61.3 63.5 72.0 75.6 70.1
TestNet2 24.1 14.9 13.5 56.3 51.3 46.2 61.3 55.2 55.0 69.1 71.2 64.0
GerNet 17.2 10.1 9.2 48.1 55 37.5 52.6 43.1 43.8 62.5 68.0 57.2
EuroNet 17.1 10.4 10.6 43.6 45.7 36.0 57.3 55.1 54.9 64.1 62.1 59.1
BellNet 23 12.8 12.1 43.3 55.3 38.6 42.8 40.2 40.0 64.2 70.1 68.1
Proposed schemes with ∗HARs, ?MNRs, §SPRs; \SBPP-FD scheme; †SBPP-FID scheme; ‡HerzBye
Hop limited scheme





















Proposed scheme with HARs
Proposed scheme with MNRs
Proposed scheme with SPRs
SBPPFID scheme
SBPPFD scheme
HerzBye hop limited scheme
Figure 4.6: Performance comparison with other existence methods in terms of redun-
dancy for Bell Canada network.
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Proposed scheme with HARs
Proposed scheme with MNRs
Proposed scheme with SPRs
SBPPFID scheme
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Figure 4.7: Performance comparison with other existence methods in terms of redun-
dancy for German network.
mation is available with working bandwidths remain the same. Table 4.5 summa-
rizes the numerical results for all methods. Figs. 4.6 and 4.7 show the variations
of required redundancy in percent with protection level for all methods over Bell-
Net and GerNet, respectively. The variations found for other networks are simi-
lar to these two networks. In all cases, the proposed SCA scheme performs bet-
ter in terms of redundancy required for protection. For example, in case of Bell-
Net, with θ = 0.4, the redundancy required for proposed SCA scheme (employing
HARs/MNRs/SPRs) is less than 23%, whereas the redundancy required by other
schemes (HerzByeHopLim/SBPP-FD/SBPP-FID) is greater than 38.6%. Again, in
case of GerNet, with θ = 0.8, the redundancy required for proposed SCA scheme (em-
ploying HARs/MNRs/SPRs) is less than 52.6%, whereas the redundancy required by
50
other schemes (HerzByeHopLim/SBPP-FD/SBPP-FID) is greater than 57.2%. The
proposed SCA scheme includes E2E the availability constraints in the LP formulation
and allocates only that amount spare capacity just to meet the E2E availability. The
HerzByeHopLim doesn’t consider E2E availability, thus it fails to reduce redundancy
unlike the proposed scheme. The SBPP-FD/FID methods allocates spare capacity
through its E2E protection path for all connections. Some of the E2E protection
paths are quite long where as in case of proposed scheme all of its protection routes




Conclusions and Future Plan
In this thesis work, a new algorithm for availability-aware spare-capacity assignment
in survivable networks has been proposed, which attempts to optimize network re-
source utilization. The proposed SCA scheme ensures that it meets the E2E availabil-
ity requirements by employing protection rings covering all links in a network scenario
where E2E bandwidth requirement of any connection is unknown. Simulation results
show that the proposed SCA scheme saves network resources significantly depending
on the availability requirement stated in SLA. Different ring selection methods are also
presented and compared from the aspect of network redundancy and LP feasibility.
The SCA scheme, that employs HARs as its protection routes, requires more redun-
dancy than the other two ring selection strategies as the former method resulted in
longer routes in some of its protection rings in order to get highest availability. How-
ever, the SCA scheme employing HARs performs better in terms of LP feasibility.
When the availability requirement is high; the scheme employing HARs still results
in feasibility where other two methods give infeasible results. This gives valid reason
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to employ rather complex ring selection method HARs in order to have feasible re-
sults. Incorporation of partial protection within the proposed architecture has also
provided a significant performance improvement by reducing the allocation of spare
capacity. The proposed SCA scheme, which utilizes different ring selection strategies,
has a significant performance improvement over other popular SCA schemes in terms
resource allocation.
A number of additional extensions to the proposed protection scheme would be
interesting. In this thesis work, for simplified availability analysis, each link is pro-
tected with single ring. When the availability requirement is too tight the LP fails
to give feasible result. This is due to the fact that some of links with lower physical
availability require protection level higher than 1. This indicates those links need to
be protected by at least one more ring to meet the availability constraint. The LP
formulation can be modified adding multiple protection rings in this scenario.
Partial protection is adopted based on the fact that on divisibility of the LSP in
the restoration phase, where the source node has the capability of randomly dropping
some service sessions of the LSP while restoration is performed. Hence, the restoration
factors (θ) derived in solving the LP for each connection are the lower bound and
should be discrete instead of continuous. The LP formulation can be modified for
discrete solution of restoration factors to support dropping granularity.
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